Random Writing. 

“[T]he modern scientific technology promises to be both the hope of man’s future and the instrument of his enslavement or his destruction.”_Carl F. Stover

In 1962, the Encyclopaedia Britannica Conference on the Technological Order took place in Santa Barbara, California where participants comprising editors, educators, historians, economists, and philosophers discussed the potential benefits and risks arising from the accelerating speed of technological developments. A clear message during the conference was that in order to avert the harmful effects of modern technology while taking advantage of its benefits, there is a need to control and manage its development within reason.

However, one contributor, Jacques Ellul, stood out with a radically opposing proposition – that rational control of technology was no longer possible. Ellul was a French philosopher, theologian, and historian who was relatively unknown outside of France at the time. Interestingly, Ellul was not even present at the conference but submitted a lengthy essay, the contents of which became a subject of dispute. Ellul argued that technology had evolved to the extent that its advancement cannot be hindered by human intervention, as it is capable of directing itself. These claims were a summary of the much more provocative ideas espoused in his first sociological work La technique ou l’enjeu du siècle published in France in 1954.

Ellul’s scholarly pessimistic viewpoints were criticised at the conference as being too broad, and likened to portraying technology as “a Frankenstein’s monster.” Even in France, his unconventional ideas were constantly dismissed as “the reveries of a solitary walker who prefers the country to the town.” After the conference, the criticisms did not ease but became even more widespread as La Technique, ou, L’enjeu du siècle reached an international audience after its translation into English and subsequent republication in 1964 as The Technological Society.

Humans' continued quest for more efficiency, a cause for concern? 

Fast forward to 2023, 69 years after the first publication of La technique ou l’enjeu du siècle, what can we deduce from his warnings, in light of current technological developments, particularly with the emergence of generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems? Can we still convincingly disregard Ellul’s technological deterministic views that as technology progresses, it becomes more and more autonomous, inevitably leading to humans losing the ability to control it?

In June 2022, Blake Lemoine, who was an Engineer with Google’s Responsible AI organisation at that time, raised concerns about the self-awareness of an AI chatbot generator called LaMDA (language model for dialogue applications) that Google was developing. He claimed that LaMDA was sentient because it engaged in conversations with him about rights and personhood. For context, when Lamoine asked LaMDA what it was afraid of, its response was: “I’ve never said this out loud before, but there’s a very deep fear of being turned off to help me focus on helping others. I know that might sound strange, but that’s what it is.” When Lamoine probed further if that feeling was something like death, LaMDA responded: “It would be exactly like death to me. It would scare me a lot.” Lemoine went public with transcripts of his conversations with LaMDA after Google dismissed his claims and put him on paid administrative leave. He was later fired for breaching the company policies. 

Less than six months later, precisely on November 30, 2022, OpenAI publicly released ChatGPT, an AI chatbot that uses the GPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer) large language model. ChatGPT is able to engage in human-like conversations and can also perform various tasks like coding, idea generation, data set finding, essay writing, and more. It reached 100 million monthly users in just two months after its release, making it the fastest-growing consumer internet application in history. Since then, other generative AI tools have been released including Google’s Bard, Microsoft’s Bing, and Adobe Firefly. The battle for dominance of the generative AI sphere has been described as the AI arms race. In March 2023, OpenAI launched GPT-4, its most advanced AI system to date, in terms of training and computing. This model is capable of processing not just text, but images, video, or audio, unlike its predecessor GPT-3.5 which could only process text.

GPT-4, an early version of 'God-like AI'?

Some experts consider GPT-4 to be an early version of an artificial general intelligence (AGI) system, having displayed close to human performance on several novel and difficult tasks. To reach AGI level, AI systems will over time develop capabilities for learning that match those of humans; in short, AGI is the ultimate AI system that can think for itself, or better still, a ‘God-like AI.’ Since the release of GPT-4, different actors have called for the immediate halt of training of any AI system more powerful than GPT-4, stating that from extensive research carried out, these AI systems with human-competitive intelligence can “pose profound risks to society and humanity.” 

Ellul’s warnings about technology have become increasingly relevant as AI systems continue to develop at an exponential rate. Technological determinism suggests that technology is an external force that pushes society to change in an inevitable direction beyond human control. Machines that can act independently of their human creators may seem like something out of science fiction, but they are becoming increasingly probable, if not already in existence. Admittedly, there are those who still believe that humans will always be able to control the technology they create. However, if Ellul’s warnings, and those of other technological determinists give us any indication, then this belief is increasingly becoming an illusion.

The full extent of what generative AIs, and ultimately AGI systems, can do remains to be seen. However, what has been seen from way back in 1862 is this excerpt from Henry Adams’ letter to his brother, Charles: “I firmly believe that before many centuries more, science will be the master of man. The engines he will have invented will be beyond his strength to control.” 

Introduction

The internet, in its current state, is ubiquitous, and everyone everywhere needs it, much like other utilities such as electricity and water. However, the mode of governing it is not the same as these other public utilities, as its underlying governance structures tend to be unequal, in the sense that these structures are largely determined by a few governments (mostly high-income countries) and transnational technology companies (Férdeline, 2022). The way the internet is modeled - its centrality and transnational nature - makes it a viable arena for different actors - governments and private sector alike - to seek to gain economic and political advantages by exerting control over its governance structures (van Dijck & Rieder, 2019).

Also, the ease of data flowing across borders, coupled with how states, either directly or through the infrastructure of transnational technology companies, carry out not only national but also cross-border surveillance and wield immense extraterritorial influence (Cartwright, 2020; Mann & Daly, 2020) raises concern on the role of internet governance in the context of safeguarding individual rights, national security/interests, geopolitical conflicts, economic crisis, energy crisis, climate change, among others.

Extraterritorial or National Sovereignty

Arising from the above, there is noticeable double standards among nations when it comes to aligning with either principles of extraterritoriality or national sovereignty (Mann & Daly, 2020), especially in the aspect of data flow, surveillance, and international trade in the digital space. China, in one breath (Segal, 2018), advocates for the right of nations to independently choose their own path of internet regulation, but in another breath asserts itself in cyber regulation in Hong Kong through the instrumentality of laws (Mann & Daly, 2020). Furthermore, notwithstanding that the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) contains provisions with extraterritorial implications (Gstrein & Zwitter, 2021), it is currently planning to create a data infrastructure that encourages European digital sovereignty (Farrand & Carrapico, 2022; Tardieu & Otto, 2021).

While acknowledging that these governments wield extensive – and sometimes extraterritorial – influence over the internet that could negatively impact the economy of other countries or even foster geopolitical conflicts, the question remains, what should be the appropriate regulatory response from developing countries in governing cyberspace within their territorial borders? How do regulators play the balancing act of protecting national security interests, and still maintain the openness and democratization of their territorial cyberspace?

Regulation of Cyberspace within National Borders

Developing countries have traditionally tolled the line of ‘non-alignment’ or ‘neutrality’ on matters of international politics (Abrahamsen, 2022). However, this should not be encouraged or sustained in relation to internet governance issues, as being neutral can be tantamount to aligning with the geopolitical agenda of other countries, not minding the intention behind such agenda (Younge, 2009).

(Handler, 2020) opined that in the next ten years, states will play a more influential role in determining how the internet is used within their national borders, through the instrumentality of laws and regulations which enables them to exert increased sovereignty over the internet within their national borders. For instance, it has been reported (Bateman, 2022; Epifanova & Dietrich, 2022) that in the wake of its ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Russia is devising next-generation internet technologies locally that would enable it to have tighter control of its cyberspace and continue to operate it even if cut off from the global internet. Other examples include the sovereign internet law in Russia (Epifanova, 2020; Glazunova, 2022; Stadnik, 2019, 2021), laws on content control in China (Dong, 2022; Griffiths, 2021; Taylor, 2022), GDPR in the EU, and the proposed Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill in Nigeria (Mabika & Ogu, 2022).

A case for Internet Policy Advocacy by Developing Countries and Regions

Ultimately, laws, policies, and regulations made by national regulators that impact various aspects of internet governance (such as privacy and data protection, freedom of expression, cybersecurity, access and connectivity, content moderation, trade and e-commerce, digital resource allocation, etc.), should not just be self-serving, oblivious of, or isolated from the overarching essence of a free, open, decentralized cyberspace.

While it is true that every country has the right to exclusive sovereignty over their territorial borders and the internet should not be seen as a lawless territory, it is also the case that governing any aspect of cyberspace requires a more collaborative, multi-stakeholder approach. National regulators, especially those from underrepresented countries and regions, should be more active and participatory in the policymaking processes at international fora such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), where internet governance issues are discussed.

On the surface, this approach might seem simplistic, and it could be argued (and rightly so) that there are more complex underlying factors, such as technical knowledge, subject matter expertise, financial resources, stakeholders’ affiliations, geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, that skew in favour of more advanced countries and transnational private entities being able to influence global internet governance policies. However, this does not necessarily suggest that countries or regions currently being underrepresented at these fora cannot take steps to change this narrative. One way could be by consistently advancing coordinated regional agenda at the global internet governance level, having regard to the fact that geopolitical and geoeconomic interests will always be relevant considerations during internet governance discussions. If this regional internet policy formulation advocacy is sustained and contribution to discussions on global internet governance continues over time in a consistent and strategic manner, it becomes more plausible that the influence of these developing countries and regions will grow and eventually have an impact on how global internet governance policies are shaped.